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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, the “injury-in-fact” standing requirement of 
Article III has frequently impeded attempts by concerned citizens and 
public interest groups to challenge government actions in federal court.   
This article proposes a way in which “citizen suits”—lawsuits 
brought by plaintiffs who wish to challenge perceived illegalities that 
affect the public as a whole—can be given a federal forum.  It argues that, 
with some limitations, Congress has authority to authorize pure citizen 
suits in Article I tribunals, and discusses the (surmountable) obstacles that 
such fora pose. 
After discussing the constitutionality of citizen suits in Article I 
tribunals, the article then turns to precedents that shed light on how such 
tribunals might function.  It highlights two, one in the United States., one 
abroad.  In the United States, the advisory opinions of the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims are a little-known example of “cases” without standing in 
an Article I tribunal today.  In Australia—which, though it obviously 
follows a different constitution with different requirements, has a 
government similar in structure to the United States’—the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal is a model for how generalized grievances with 
government affairs might be aired in a court-like setting. 
In short, the U.S. Constitution permits citizen suits—just not in 
Article III courts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE MODERN LAW OF STANDING 
The past few decades have seen a dramatic tightening of the requirements for 
standing to sue in federal court.1 In particular, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife heralded a new era in which Article III limits the power of 
Congress to grant members of the general public a right to sue.2 Perhaps because 
standing is an issue that is most vexing when an issue affects the public at large, this era 
has also seen standing arise as a potential problem in a variety of legal disputes that have 
 
1 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–97 (1992) (summarizing the history of American 
standing law and tracing the development of the modern “injury-in-fact” requirement to 
the 1960s and 1970s).   
2 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the Environmental Protection Act’s 
“citizen-suit” provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), cannot grant “any person” the power to file 
suit in federal court.  504 U.S. 555, 571–73 (1992).  The relevant provision of the EPA 
provides that “any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf  . . . to enjoin any 
person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.”   
3captured national attention, including challenges to the Bush administration’s wiretapping 
programs,3 global warming,4 and the constitutionality of public-school recitations of the 
Pledge of Allegiance.5
Although Lujan was not the first Supreme Court case to exhibit a heightened 
concern for standing requirements,6 and its effects have been mitigated significantly by 
the Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 
Inc.,7 Lujan was the first case to clearly enunciate, as a matter of constitutional import, 
the current “injury-in-fact” test for standing.8
Under this test, plaintiffs wishing to challenge government action must not only 
have a substantive cause of action under which they are entitled to bring suit, but as a 
threshold matter they must have suffered an “injury-in-fact”:  “an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”9 Moreover, this “injury-in-fact” must have been caused by 
 
3 See, e.g., The NSA Eavesdropping Opinion and Standing, Posting of Dale Carpenter to 
The Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com/posts/1155856278.shtml (August 17, 
2006, 19:11 PST). 
4 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 
(June 26, 2006).  Standing thus promises to be a major issue in one of the most 
significant decisions of the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term. 
5 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (dismissing First 
Amendment challenge to the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance’s “under God” 
language on the grounds that the affected child’s father lacked standing). 
6 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);  see also Sunstein, supra note 1, at 
193–95 (discussing pre-Lujan cases that examined standing as a distinct inquiry from the 
presence of a cause of action). 
7 528 U.S. 167 (2000).  Laidlaw held that even though a group of plaintiffs could not 
demonstrate that they, their land, or their environment had been physically harmed in any 
way, they had standing because their fears of health risks had diminished their use and 
enjoyment of the North Tyger River, the alleged pollution of which was at issue.  Id. at 
181–83, 187–88. 
8 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
9 Id. (internal quote marks and citations omitted). 
4the conduct complained of, and it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” that 
the injury will be redressed should the court rule for the plaintiff.10 
Citizen suit plaintiffs such as those in Lujan do not in the general case meet these 
requirements.  Members of the general public are not concretely nor particularly injured 
simply because they perceive executive action or inaction as contrary to law, nor if they 
believe that a private party is not in compliance with regulation.11 Even if a personalized 
injury is threatened, the  “actual or imminent” requirement means that only sufficiently 
likely threats are serious enough to be judicially cognizable;  mere remote possibilities of 
harm to the plaintiff are insufficient.12 And even though Laidlaw held that this 
requirement would not preclude injuries based on perceived, rather than actual, risks,13 
standing still requires that the perceived injury be to the plaintiffs in particular.14 The 
requirement of standing to sue is constitutional in stature:  “a plaintiff raising only a 
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every 
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws . . . —does not state 
an Article III case or controversy.”15 Even an explicit statutory grant to the general 
public of a right to sue, as was present in Lujan, can therefore not grant standing.16 
10 Id. at 560–61 (internal quote marks and citations omitted). 
11 See id. at 562–63. 
12 See La. Env. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384 (D.C. Cir.1996). 
13 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 187–88 
(2000). 
14 Cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 65 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff lacked standing 
to enjoin enforcement of a police chokehold policy because he could not demonstrate that 
he personally was likely to be injured by it in the future). 
15 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74. 
16 See id. at 571–73; see also supra note 2. 
5Both Lujan and Laidlaw arose in the environmental context,17 and environmental 
statutes have been the paradigmatic examples of congressional attempts to grant causes of 
action to the general public.18 However, in addition to environmental law and to the 
examples cited above,19 standing has been a barrier to suits challenging government 
action or inaction in a wide variety of other fields, including treatment of individuals with 
disabilities,20 initiation of child support proceedings,21 tax policy,22 and discrimination in 
local zoning ordinances.23 A constitutional limitation on congressional power to confer 
standing therefore poses a general constraint on Congress’s power to craft enforcement 
schemes for its regulatory programs.  Although such non-adjudicatory mechanisms as 
notice-and-comment rulemaking are still available  to politically-interested but not 
“injured-in-fact” citizens who wish to weigh in on regulatory matters,24 such mechanisms 
 
17 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 175–78;  see also Jonathan H. 
Adler, Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From Lujan to 
Laidlaw and Beyond: Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental 
Protection, 12 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 39 (2001). 
18 According to Prof. Sunstein, writing shortly after Lujan was decided, every major 
environmental statute then in force except FIFRA contained a citizen suit provision.  
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 165 n.11. 
19 See supra notes 3 and 5 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., DeLil v. El Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94–3900, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 
(N.D. Cal. June 23, 1997) (barring a plaintiff from suing over a restaurant’s illegally 
locked wheelchair lift because suggestion that the plaintiff might return was speculative);  
see also Elizabeth Keadle Markey, Note, The ADA’s Last Stand?: Standing and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 185 (2002). 
21 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
22 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26 (1976). 
23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (Administrative Procedure Act); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking as a 
mechanism for “assur[ing] due deliberation” in the creation of new or modified 
regulations). 
6have their disadvantages;25 in particular, they are most capable of providing a forum for 
citizen input when an executive agency is considering regulations of its own accord, 
rather than when a citizen wishes to challenge action or inaction under existing, static 
regulations.26 What Lujan has done is narrow the range of alternative mechanisms that 
Congress can impose;  it restricts the availability of judicial review in Article III federal 
courts to those situations where some party with the ability and inclination to sue has 
suffered a redressable “injury-in-fact.” 27 Congress, however, may wish to take 
advantage of the agency-external, plaintiff-initiated legal system as a check on executive 
action, and make this system available at a stage of agency action where injuries are still 
hypothetical.28 Indeed, if citizen suits in non-Article III tribunals are possible, but 
Congress is free to establish these tribunals with more flexible procedures than the 
Article III courts are equipped to provide,29 such tribunals might provide a suitable forum 
 
25 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 484 n.109 (2003) (surveying the 
literature on the “ossification” of the agency rulemaking process that some scholars have 
blamed on lengthy and cumbersome notice-and-comment procedures). 
26 See id. at 481–84 (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking as an “idealized 
legislative process” intended in part to make the enactment of new regulations more 
majoritarian). 
27 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 564 & n.2 (1992) 
(discussing “actual or imminent” harm requirement). 
28 See Robert B. June, Citizen Suits: The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen 
Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 Envtl. L. 761, 764–65 (1994) (describing 
Congress’s motivations for augmenting the Clean Air Act with a citizen suit provision, as 
well as some of the ways in which Congress—by legislative means rather than standing 
requirements—limited the availability of citizen suits to minimize frivolous litigation). 
29 See infra Part III (discussing the flexible procedures available in both Court of Federal 
Claims advisory cases and in the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal). 
7for the adjudication of complex, “polycentric” regulatory disputes that some scholars 
have suggested ordinary courts are ill-equipped to handle.30 
Under the Lujan conception of standing, does there remain any way for Congress to 
provide for these kinds of judicial challenges to government action or inaction that has 
not given rise to a cognizable “case or controversy” involving the individuals who are 
challenging it?  At least one commentator has suggested that the answer is yes, and that 
non-Article III judicial bodies—such as Article I “legislative courts”—might serve as a 
forum for hearing citizen suits.31 
B. ARTICLE I COURTS: A SOLUTION?
It is well-established—through long practice if not always coherent theory32—that 
Congress has the power to create Article I courts to hear at least certain classes of 
disputes.33 The federal courts literature is rich with examinations of the degree to which 
the judicial power can be extended to these non-Article III tribunals.34 Much of the 
concern stems from the uncertainty surrounding whether, or when, Congress may 
 
30 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) 
(arguing that the traditional adversarial system is ill-equipped to handle problems, called 
“polycentric,” with complicated effects on a multiplicity of parties). 
31 James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposals for Congressional Response to Supreme 
Court “Standing” Decisions, 13 VT. L. REV. 675, 684–89 (1989).  Professor Dumont, of 
course, was writing before Lujan, but the substance of his proposal applies equally well 
today. 
32 See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 239 (1990) (“The Supreme Court opinions 
devoted to the subject of the validity of legislative and administrative tribunals are as 
troubled, arcane, confused and confusing as could be imagined.”). 
33 See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63–64 
(1982); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
284 (1855). 
34 E.g., Bator, supra note 32; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative 
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative 
Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291 (1990);  Judith Resnick, 
“Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the 
Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2001). 
8withdraw from the jurisdiction of Article III courts—and assign to some non-Article III 
federal decisionmaker—cases that fall within the jurisdictional heads of Article III, which 
does place at least some uncertain constraints on the power of Congress to invest judicial 
power in non-Article III bodies. 35 In the words of Justice O’Connor, “Article III serves 
both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme” and 
“to safeguard litigants’ right to have claims decided before judges who are free from 
potential domination by other branches of government.”36 At the same time, the 
consensus is that Article III is not absolute;37 at a minimum, Congress can assign 
disputes on specialized topics within the reach of its substantive lawmaking powers to 
non-Article III administrative decisionmakers, at least if the decisions are subject to 
judicial review and/or enforcement and the disputes are related to a comprehensive 
federal program, even if parts of them arise under state law.38 It can also assign 
appropriate cases to territorial courts39 and military tribunals,40 and can create courts to 
adjudicate so-called “public rights” disputes.41 
However, Article I citizen suit tribunals pose a different problem.  They would 
probably not constitute a withdrawal of Article III jurisdiction in the first place, because 
 
35 See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) 
(holding that granting broad jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy judges is 
unconstitutional);  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 284 (1855) (arguing that Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial [Article 
III] cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common 
law, or in equity, or admiralty”). 
36 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (internal 
citations and quote marks omitted). 
37 See id. (“Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary 
consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court.”). 
38 See id. at 851–57 (1986). 
39 E.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 516 (1828). 
40 E.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858). 
41 See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982). 
9citizen suits involve, by hypothesis, a plaintiff who has no Article III “case.”42 The 
question, then, is not the traditional federal courts one of whether Congress can take an 
Article III case and entrust it to another federal adjudicative body;  rather, the question is 
whether Congress can authorize the adjudication in any forum of a “non-case”—in 
particular, these “non-cases”—outside Article III.  Congress can grant federal courts and 
tribunals—within and without Article III—the power to hear, as a matter of supplemental 
jurisdiction, claims, such as state law claims between citizens of the same state, that fall 
outside the Article III heads of jurisdiction.43 And adjudicatory decisions outside the 
scope of adversarial “cases” are conducted by executive officials daily.44 Article III does 
not impose an absolute limit on the ability of Congress to grant judicial powers outside 
the Article III heads to Article I bodies.45 However, there are a number of reasons why 
 
42 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74. 
43 In Article III fora, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (granting supplemental jurisdiction 
over state law claims to the U.S. district courts);  United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 
383 U.S. 715 (1966) (granting same, and upholding constitutionality, as a matter of 
common law).  In non-Article III fora, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding supplemental jurisdiction of state-law claims by 
the administrative Commodities Futures Tradition Commission).  Formally, of course, 
causes of action falling within the supplemental jurisdiction of a court may be seen as 
part of the same “case” as the main cause of action.  More broadly, though, the 
availability of supplemental jurisdiction—given the right procedural posture—suggests 
that the power of federal courts can in some circumstances extend somewhat beyond the 
questions that a direct reading of Article III would imply. 
44 See Bator, supra note 34, at 264–65 (discussing how executive branch officials must 
regularly exercise effectively judicial power in applying their understanding of the 
relevant law to their execution of it). 
45 But see William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 282–84 (1990) (arguing for a 
common “case or controversy” standard in state and federal courts).  The logical 
consequence of Fletcher’s arguments—that limited Article III justiciability requirements 
should apply equally in state and federal courts so as to preserve the integrity of judicial 
power and ensure the availability of Supreme Court review—is that the same standard 
should apply in non-Article III federal tribunals as well. 
10
Congress might be otherwise limited in its power to establish legislative courts to hear 
citizen suits, and these reasons are the subject of this article. 
Part II of this article will explore a number of these arguments as to why the 
constitutionality of citizen suit tribunals—even in non-Article III fora—is a close and 
vexed question under U.S. case law, at least where binding judgments are to be issued 
and appellate review is necessary or desirable.  Part III of this article will then look at two 
possible case studies, one domestic, and one foreign:  the congressional reference 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and the Australian Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal. 
This article will neither analyze the correctness of the Lujan standing model,46 nor 
will it take a position on the wisdom of permitting citizen suits, within Article III courts 
or without.47 Its sole focus is the constitutionality of assigning such suits—which 
Congress has for its own reasons authorized from time to time—to Article I tribunals—
which Congress has likewise created, for other purposes.  What it will ultimately 
conclude is that granting authority to adjudicate citizen suits to Article I tribunals is 
constitutional, even when the tribunals are given the power to issue binding judgments.  
Although prudential standing concerns mean that non-Article III tribunals should only 
hear “non-cases” in the presence of a clear congressional command, that command is 
Congress’s to give. 
 
46 Compare Sunstein, supra note 1, with Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of 
Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 (1993). 
47 For an intriguing article suggesting that, at least some of the time, environmental 
citizen suit provisions may do more harm than good, see Adler, supra note 17. 
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II. ARE CITIZEN SUITS IN ARTICLE I TRIBUNALS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PERMISSIBLE?
Even if standing is formally an Article III doctrine that does not constrain 
legislative courts and similar non-Article III tribunals directly, a number of other 
constitutional concerns plague any attempt to grant citizen suit jurisdiction to a non-
Article III tribunal.  Part II.A addresses the foremost among these problems: whether a 
binding judgment from a non-Article III citizen suit tribunal is constitutional.  Although a 
non-Article III citizen suit might result in a purely advisory, non-binding declaration—in 
which case its constitutionality is fairly certain48— Congress might also want to confer 
the power to issue binding judgments, backed by the full coercive power of the 
government.  The granting of the power to coerce outside Article III might be 
unconstitutional, and is particularly suspect if citizen suit jurisdiction extends to suits 
against nongovernmental actors who fail to comply with regulations.49 Citizen suits 
against nongovernmental defendants implicate the individual rights of those defendants, 
and there is thus a stronger argument for requiring that they be conducted in a tribunal 
with Article III protections.   
Part II.B addresses a second important question that arises if citizen suit tribunal 
decisions can be binding: whether they can receive appellate review in an Article III 
court.  If so, the constitutional concerns arising from a non-Article III tribunal might be 
substantially alleviated.50 Parts II.C and II.D address additional questions that arise as to 
 
48 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
49 The suit in Laidlaw fell into this category.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2000);  see also infra Part II.E. 
50 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334–35 (1816) (arguing that 
federal questions must be able to be heard in federal court, but that a hearing on appeal is 
adequate); infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
12
whether Article II or other separation of powers concerns pose an alternate barrier to 
hearing citizen suit cases, questions that cut to the core of the United States government’s 
structure.51 Finally, Part II.E will suggest that where citizen suits are against government 
officials rather than private parties, they likely fall within the set of “public rights” that 
may already be granted to non-Article III tribunals.52 Ultimately, Article I citizen suits 
are viable, but this Part will examine each of the potential issues in turn. 
A. THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM—CAN A NON-ARTICLE III COURT ISSUE BINDING 
ORDERS?
The most serious problem facing any proposal to grant jurisdiction over citizen suits 
to an Article I tribunal is the question of how—or whether—that tribunal’s judgments are 
to be enforced.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one factor supporting the 
constitutionality of an Article I adjudication is that the adjudication does not attempt to 
issue binding judgments.53 The underlying arguments seem to be, first, that coercive 
power is dangerous—only Article III courts, with their guarantees of judicial 
independence, should have the power to, for instance, imprison someone for contempt of 
court should they disobey an injunction; 54 and second, that the power to issue binding 
 
51 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1967) (remarking that the terms “cases” and 
“controversies” have “an iceberg quality,” containing “submerged complexities which go 
to the very heart of our constitutional form of government”). 
52 See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982);  
supra note 41. 
53 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).  Writing 
for the Court, Justice O’Connor contrasted the constitutionally-permissible Article I 
adjudications in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) and in Schor—both of which 
involved orders that could only be enforced by action in an Article III district court—with 
the adjudication held impermissible in Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), which invalidated a scheme in which non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges could issue coercive orders directly.  See 478 U.S. at 853. 
54 Cf. FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 761 (2002) (contrasting the contempt 
power of courts with the inability of the Federal Maritime Commission to issue binding 
orders).  Intriguingly, the Court in FMC found this difference unavailing as to the 
13
orders is an “essential attribute[] of judicial power” that Article III requires be vested in 
Article III courts.55 The latter objection is one instance of the limitations on Article I 
tribunals generally, discussed above.56 The former, however, poses a new problem:  does 
the Constitution require that coercive action be undertaken only by the constitutionally 
independent Article III judiciary? 
Conceivably, a citizen suit tribunal might be limited to purely advisory declarations, 
not backed by force of law but nonetheless useful as an opportunity for litigants to air 
grievances before a neutral tribunal and perhaps difficult as a political matter for 
government actors to ignore.57 A government official losing a citizen suit would 
 
question presented:  whether a state agency should be entitled to sovereign immunity in 
an administrative proceeding.  Id. The Court emphasized the similarities between Article 
III court proceedings and administrative adjudications, noting the procedural safeguards 
that administrative proceedings, though falling outside of Article III, typically possessed.  
Id. at 756–57 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)).  One can argue from 
FMC that Article I courts—being similar to Article III courts, and perhaps possessing 
parallel safeguards against judicial overreaching—should be subject to the same standing 
restrictions as Article III courts.  The inference might point in the opposite direction, 
however:  standing requirements are intended to enforce separation of powers, not the 
rights of litigants, and where procedural safeguards are statutorily available (as they 
might be in a bindingly-adjudicating citizen suit tribunal), FMC suggests that there is 
little reason to withhold power from a tribunal just because it has not been created under 
Article III.  For example, the Court noted, with no apparent disfavor, the ability of 
administrative law judges to issue subpoenas.  Id. at 756. 
55 See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81 (1982).  
56 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
57 By way of comparison, the U.S. Court of Claims functioned successfully for decades 
without a guarantee that its judgments would be paid. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The 
History of Claims Against the United States:  The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a 
Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 659–60, 680–82 (1985). As a practical 
matter, the vast majority were. Id. at 659–62.  To this day, advisory judgments of the 
Court of Federal Claims have no independent legal force, and there is no requirement that 
they be paid—they are but recommendations to Congress—but as a matter of practice, 
most are.  See infra Part III.A. Of course, a suit requesting that funds from the treasury 
be paid out by Congress is not quite analogous to a suit demanding individual executive 
action:  in the Court of Claims’ case, the same body that had established the tribunal as a 
matter of convenience—Congress—was being asked to respect the tribunal’s judgments.  
14
probably be under significant political pressure to comply even without a formally 
binding order;  many government officials would probably think twice before publicly 
proceeding with action adjudicated to be illegal.  And if defendant officials ignore a 
judgment of the tribunal, alternate plaintiffs who do have an Article III injury-in-fact 
might still come forward with an action of their own in an Article III court, using the 
tribunal’s judgment for its persuasive effect:  the risks and costs of such a suit would 
probably be considerably lower than the risks and costs of bringing an action for the first 
time.58 Like purely advisory judgments of the Court of Federal Claims, the granting of 
such purely advisory authority to an Article I “court” would probably be comparatively 
uncontroversial.59 
However, an Article I court with the power to issue fully binding judgments would 
be a more complete replacement for the Article III citizen suits that Lujan precludes, and 
such an Article I court may yet be possible.  The presumption against letting Article I 
decisionmakers issue binding judgments is not absolute.  Article I legislative courts have 
been granted the power to issue binding orders directly and enforce them by fine or 
 
58 Indeed, the granting of preclusive or nearly-preclusive effect to the decisions of non-
Article III adjudicators is well established;  administrative factfinders are traditionally 
given great deference in Article III enforcement proceedings.  See Martin Redish, 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 197, 217 (citing  Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic 
Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).  Even if such 
preclusive effect is not afforded to the judgments of an advisory citizen suit tribunal 
because it is not adjudicating “cases,” the legal conclusions of the advisory tribunal may 
have persuasive effect, and the fact that the case has been effectively litigated already 
may reduce litigation costs to a potential plaintiff who does have standing and who 
wishes to bring suit in an Article III court. 
59 See infra Part III.A. 
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imprisonment. 60 Indeed, Congress itself has the ability to punish contempt;  to avoid the 
potential for political abuse, this is typically accomplished by means of a criminal 
proceeding in an Article III court,61 but Congress retains the inherent power to punish 
contempts insofar as is necessary to carry out its functions.62 The judgments of certain 
administrative agencies also become binding automatically after a certain time.63 Those 
that do not are typically afforded great deference in subsequent enforcement proceedings, 
a fact that one commentator has argued renders practically meaningless the distinction 
between limiting the power of an adjudicator by requiring an Article III enforcement 
proceeding, and simply allowing appeals to be taken to an Article III court.64 
Furthermore, the District of Columbia65 and territorial66 courts, though established by 
Congress outside Article III, are able to issue binding judgments.  Most broadly, that 
 
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 2521(b) (2000) (granting to the Article I Court of Federal Claims the 
power to “punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority 
as . . . disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command.” 
61 E.g., 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2000) (making refusal to testify or produce papers in a 
congressional investigation a misdemeanor); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 
(1962) (upholding conviction for same). 
62 See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 540–45 (1917).  The Court distinguished 
punitive sanctions from those necessary to carry out the functions of Congress.  Id. at 
542.  In the case at hand, the petitioner was being held for having been “defamatory and 
insulting”;  the Court determined that punishment for such alleged offenses was beyond 
the power of Congress to impose directly.  Id. at 545–46, 548.  By way of contrast, the 
Court suggested that imprisonment of someone until such time as they agreed to testify 
would be constitutional.  Id. at 543. 
63 For example, decisions of the Federal Trade Commission become binding 
automatically if the period for filing a petition for review elapses.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) 
(2000). 
64 Redish, supra note 58, at 216–19.  See infra, Section 5, for a discussion of whether and 
when orders of a citizen suit tribunal might be appealable to an Article III court. 
65 See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 375–76 & n.4 (1977) (describing the District of 
Columbia court system and upholding criminal convictions by it). 
66 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 516 (1828) (upholding judicial powers of 
the territorial courts of Florida). 
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there is no blanket constitutional prohibition on allowing tribunals without Article III 
protections to exercise coercive authority is evident from the presence of state courts in 
the constitutional plan.67 This last argument is blunted by the possibility that there is a 
unique constitutional problem with federal tribunals created outside Article III, but this 
possibility—at least at its most absolute—is belied by the apparent acceptance of Article 
I tribunals in the various other contexts discussed here.68 More serious remaining 
challenges to the constitutionality of an Article I citizen suit tribunal come from the 
issues that the next sections will address:  whether such a tribunal’s judgments can be 
reviewable in an Article III court (which would be a significant, and perhaps necessary, 
factor weighing in favor of their constitutionality); and whether such a tribunal would 
raise independent separation of powers problems. 
B. THE ABILITY TO APPEAL FROM A CITIZEN SUIT TRIBUNAL TO AN ARTICLE III 
COURT 
A great deal of authority suggests that an important reason why adjudications by 
non-Article III decisionmakers can be constitutional is the availability of appeals to 
Article III courts, particularly where constitutional defenses are implicated.69 The 
reviewability of decisions by an Article I citizen suit tribunal thus becomes important to 
 
67 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing for concurrent 
jurisdiction in the state courts over federal questions).   
68 See supra Part I.B (discussing types of cases that can be, and are, placed in the 
jurisdiction of Article I tribunals). 
69 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334–35 (1816) (arguing that 
cases arising under federal question jurisdiction must be able to be heard in federal court 
either originally or on appeal);  Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress’ Authority to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 
70 (1981) (arguing that where constitutional claims are concerned, the Article III federal 
courts cannot be completely deprived of jurisdiction). Cf. Battaglia v. General Motors 
Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (arguing that due process requires deprivations 
of life, liberty, or property to be judicially reviewable). 
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the constitutionality of such a tribunal, particularly if it is to issue binding judgments.70 
The question of appealability requires different analyses in each of the two possible 
outcomes for an adjudication of a claim:  a judgment for the citizen-plaintiff challenging 
government action, and ordering a government official to obey the law;  and a judgment 
for the defendant government officials, whereupon the status quo is preserved. 
A judgment for the citizen-plaintiff is the situation in which the appealability 
concerns brought out by coercive judgments are important, because only there is anyone 
coerced by the judgment of the court.  However, one recent Supreme Court precedent, 
ASARCO v. Kadish, suggests that even where original plaintiffs lack standing in an initial 
citizen-suit lawsuit, the defendants affected by an adverse judgment will have standing to 
appeal.71 Some state court systems permit citizen suits, and in ASARCO, the Supreme 
Court confronted the problem of whether these suits can be appealed to Article III courts 
(in this case the Supreme Court) despite the plaintiffs’ lack of standing.72 The Court 
applied its test for standing not to the original plaintiffs, but to the petitioners—state 
officials who had received an adverse judgment in the state court; observed that if it 
“were to agree with petitioners, [its] reversal of the decision below would remove its 
disabling effects upon them”; and held that that lower court decision constituted an actual 
injury.73 It thus concluded that the petitioners had standing, and that the Court could hear 
the appeal.74 A similar argument would likely apply to defendants in a citizen suit 
tribunal who attempt to appeal an adverse judgment;  ASARCO suggests that there would 
 
70 If its judgments are non-binding, then any enforcement would have to be done in an 
Article III court. 
71 See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 618–19. 
74 Id. at 619. 
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be no constitutional bar to their standing to appeal, and a statutory bar (which would itself 
pose constitutional difficulties75) is avoidable by means of an appropriately drafted 
jurisdictional statute.76 
In the second situation, a judgment for the defendants, no appeal would be 
available;  standing is as necessary on appeal as in an original suit.77 A citizen-plaintiff 
lacking standing would thus be unable to appeal an adverse ruling from a citizen suit 
tribunal.  However, that same citizen-plaintiff lacks any judicially cognizable injury;  the 
absence of a provision for review (in an Article III court or otherwise) would thus be 
unlikely to raise any constitutional problems.78 If there were constitutional difficulties in 
denying citizen-plaintiffs an Article III forum to air their grievances in, it would be 
anomalous indeed to systematically dismiss such suits for lack of standing from Article 
III courts. 
On the other hand, it is not clear whether ASARCO can be extended this far.  The 
ASARCO decision rested in part on the importance of deference to and respect for state 
court judgments;  the Supreme Court found itself in the paradoxical situation of having to 
choose between reviewing a case that, when initially brought, did not meet Article III 
 
75 See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257, and the discussion supra 
accompanying note 69.  
76 Even without a direct appeal route, however, some of the constitutional difficulties 
might be resolved by recourse to habeas corpus. Although habeas applies only to 
deprivations of liberty, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), its “historical core” is “as a means 
of reviewing the legality of executive detention,” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 
(2001), which is what a detention imposed as a contempt sanction by a non-Article III 
tribunal would, in some sense, be. 
77 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (“The standing 
Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be 
met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.”). 
78 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (dismissing citizen suit for 
lack of standing). 
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requirements, and having to vacate a state court judgment rendered within the state 
court’s rightful authority.79 Citing its respective treatment of lower federal courts and 
state courts in the mootness context,80 the Court expressed resistance to the idea that it 
could reasonably take the latter course and vacate the state court judgment, given that the 
judgment was legal by the laws of the state and that concurrent jurisdiction over federal 
questions is within the “proper role” of state courts.81 ASARCO thus rests, at least in part, 
on federalism concerns that do not apply to an Article I federal citizen suit tribunal:  as to 
federal courts, the Supreme Court’s role is “supervisory,” and there is no reason for the 
Court not to interfere by taking an appeal where the case could not have been brought 
under Article III.82 
The force of this counterargument is significantly reduced, however, by the 
different postures of a lower Article III court and a hypothetical citizen suit tribunal.  The 
reason why the Supreme Court takes a “supervisory” role with lower federal courts, and 
does not hesitate to vacate judgments in cases that fail to meet Article III justiciability 
requirements, is that lower federal courts are bound by Article III, and the Supreme 
Court’s role is in part to ensure that they correctly apply Article III’s requirements.83 In 
comparison, for the Supreme Court to enforce Article III justiciability requirements on a 
non-Article III tribunal on the grounds that federal courts, unlike state courts, are bound 
by Article III is to beg the question:  it is quite possible that Article I courts, if so 
 
79 See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 620–21 & n.1. 
80 When the controversy has become moot, the Court’s standard procedure is to vacate 
lower federal court judgments and remand with instructions to dismiss, but to dismiss 
appeals from state high courts and leave the underlying judgment undisturbed.  Id. at 621 
n.1. 
81 Id. at 620. 
82 Id. at 621 n.1. 
83 See id. at 620–21. 
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empowered by Congress, are within their authority to issue binding judgments in suits 
that do not qualify as “cases” under Article III.  If the only impediment to such judgments 
is the lack of Article III appellate justiciability, it would be paradoxical, or at least 
awkwardly circular, to rule that such judgments are impermissible because of the lack of 
appeals, but that appeals are impermissible because of the impermissibility of the 
judgments.  A simpler reading of ASARCO might be to read the section on federalism as 
rightly distinguishing state courts from Article III federal courts, but remaining silent as 
to other federal adjudicators;  under this reading, while the federalism rationale 
supporting Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in ASARCO does not support appellate 
jurisdiction in a citizen suit tribunal, neither does it argue against appellate jurisdiction 
there.  The other primary argument that the ASARCO Court made in favor of appellate 
jurisdiction—that a losing defendant in the lower court might suffer an actual injury-in-
fact from an adverse binding judgment, even where the plaintiff lacked one84—still 
holds.85 
84 See id. at 618–19. 
85 See also Brian A. Stern, Note, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77, 101–08 (1994). Stern 
argued that the core concern of ASARCO was upholding the separation-of-powers 
requirement that Article III courts only adjudicate real cases between parties, but that this 
requirement is fulfilled—and the separation of powers concerns addressed—where a 
party has had its legal interests impinged by a binding adverse judgment, regardless of 
the standing of the original plaintiff.  Id. Stern distinguished Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54 (1986), which held that an adverse judgment by itself not enough to support 
standing on appeal, on the grounds that in Diamond the defendant was an intervenor who 
suffered no actual legal injury when the side with which he had aligned himself in the 
lower court litigation lost.  Id. at 105–06. 
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A second troubling aspect of extending ASARCO is the asymmetry between losing 
citizen-plaintiffs, who cannot appeal, and losing defendants, who can.86 However, a 
number of factors mitigate the effects of this seemingly bizarre result.  First, the plaintiffs 
who are put at a disadvantage are by definition not injured parties;  they have suffered no 
constitutionally cognizable harm, and they may be assumed to have entered the 
potentially-asymmetrical adjudication aware of its risks.  Second, to the extent that the 
asymmetry gives the citizen suit tribunal an incentive to decide cases in one direction so 
as to avoid appellate review, that incentive probably points in the less-damaging 
direction, favoring a presumption of regularity and an assumption that the challenged 
regulations are legal. 87 Finally, asymmetries in appellate proceedings are not completely 
alien to American jurisprudence:  most notably, when a criminal defendant wins at the 
trial level, the government generally has no right to appeal.88 Thus, although ASARCO is 
not as unambiguous as it may first appear, it probably supports a right on the part of a 
losing citizen suit defendant to appeal an adverse binding ruling, and this in turn puts any 
binding rulings within the supervision of the Article III courts.  Probably the biggest 
factor weighing in favor of the constitutionality of such judgments—Article III review—
is thus probably available. 
 
86 See Fletcher, supra note 45, at 280–82 (arguing against the ASARCO decision because 
it “makes appellate review available in a perversely asymmetrical way”). 
87 In contrast, Prof. Fletcher’s primary argument against the asymmetry in ASARCO was 
that the presumption favored the wrong side in the state court context:  state court 
judgments, he argued, are most in need of Supreme Court review where they have failed 
to strike down a state law on federal grounds—the state of affairs where a citizen-plaintiff 
loses and the judgment is unreviewable.  Id. 
88 E.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 126–31 (1980). 
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C. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE 
Another likely source for a limitation on the power of Congress to create Article I 
citizen suit tribunals is the Take Care Clause of Article II.89 In addition to the core 
Article III argument, Lujan itself rested partially on an Article II argument.90 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Scalia wrote that  
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in 
executive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” 
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the 
President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional 
duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”91 
Professor Cass Sunstein has forcefully attacked this holding, arguing that Scalia’s 
insistence on a “‘unitary executive’ . . . free from interference from others”92 is 
undermined by the clear availability of the judiciary to “interfere” with executive action 
when a plaintiff who does have a cognizable injury-in-fact—and thus standing—brings 
suit.93 In Sunstein’s view, the Article II critique of citizen standing rests on the premise 
that “oversight of bureaucratic implementation falls to the President, not to Congress or 
the courts”;94 the problem with citizen suits under this argument is that they represent an 
intrusion on the power of the executive to freely execute the law.95 Sunstein then 
dismisses the Article II argument, rightly pointing out that there is no more interference 
with a challenged administrative agency when a citizen plaintiff sues than when a 
plaintiff with an injury-in-fact—in the case of Lujan, perhaps just a plane ticket to go see 
 
89 “[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . .”  U.S. 
CONST., art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
90 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
91 Id. 
92 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 212 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
93 Id. at 213. 
94 Id. at 212. 
95 See id. at 213. 
23
endangered animals96—does so.97 If Sunstein is correct, the Take Care Clause should 
have no impact on the ability of a citizen plaintiff to challenge government action, 
whether in an Article III court or in an Article I tribunal:  the ability of courts to 
“interfere” with executive action by ordering relief in ordinary Article III suits is well-
established.98 
There is a more subtle Take Care Clause argument against citizen suits, however, 
that might still have some bite against them even in a non-Article III tribunal:  that they 
interfere not with the executive as a defendant, but with the executive as a potential 
plaintiff.99 According to this view, which is probably at least part of the conception of 
 
96 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
97 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 213.  
98 See id. 
99 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (arguing that “vindicating the public interest” (emphasis 
omitted) is the prerogative of the executive).  That Sunstein’s understanding of the Take 
Care argument is of the former type is evident from his conclusion that the Take Care 
concern is “entirely inapplicable when the government is not . . . a party,” as when the 
citizen suit is against a private defendant.  Sunstein, supra note 1, at 231.  Sunstein makes 
passing mention of the possibility that the Take Care violation occurs when a suit 
interferes with prosecutorial discretion, but dismisses that argument as “surely” lacking 
constitutional status. Id. at 231 n.300.  But the interference with prosecution appears to be 
the more forceful concern:  the argument is that only the executive has the power to take 
care that laws are enforced by suing in parens patriae on behalf of a generalized, public 
interest.  See Morrison v. Olson, 504 U.S. 652, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976). 
 One scholar has approached the relationship between prosecutorial authority and 
standing from the opposite direction, and argued that the ability of the United States to 
bring suit in criminal prosecutions undermines the claim that plaintiffs must be personally 
injured to have standing.  Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How 
Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the 
Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2248 (1999).  Interestingly, Hartnett’s approach 
suggests an interpretation of the Article II Take Care Clause that both undermines his 
argument and supports the constitutionality of Article I citizen suits.  If standing is indeed 
an Article III doctrine that requires a plaintiff to have a personal stake in litigation, the 
Take Care Clause might provide that stake with respect to prosecutions:  as the official 
entrusted to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3, cl. 
4, the President might under the Take Care clause have just that personal stake in 
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the Take Care Clause held by Justice Scalia,100 the problem with citizen suits is that they 
permit members of the public to serve as “private attorneys-general” vindicating not 
individuated rights of a minority, but the generalized interests of the majority.101 
This sort of interference with the executive would pose difficulties for citizen suits 
in Article I tribunals as much as for Article III tribunals, but it has certain weaknesses.  
Most notably, there exists a centuries-long history of private enforcement actions, 
including qui tam and relator actions, that historically permitted plaintiffs with no 
personal injury to sue in place of the government.102 The Supreme Court has upheld the 
Article III standing of qui tam relators,103 and although it avoided deciding their 
constitutionality under the Take Care Clause, it held that that question was “not a 
jurisdictional issue” that needed to be resolved before deciding the merits.104 The 
consensus position on the Court seems to be that despite Justice Scalia’s discussion of 
Article II in Lujan,105 even though standing jurisprudence “may sometimes have an 
 
vindicating the public interest, and only he or she would have the power to prosecute 
“standing-less” criminal suits in the Article III courts to vindicate public interests.  This 
conception of the Take Care Clause is an affirmative grant of standing rather than an 
independent limitation on the power of others to sue, and therefore would not adversely 
affect the constitutionality of citizen suits outside Article III courts. 
100 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that independent 
prosecutors represent an unconstitutional usurpation of the executive’s authority to 
control criminal prosecutions).  
101 See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 46, at 1800–01, 1805–08. 
102 For example, in Steel Co., Justice Stevens cited a long American history of private 
criminal prosecutions in nineteenth-century American state courts.  Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 127–28 & n.25 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  Professor Hartnett has also noted that at least in England, the 
extraordinary writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari could also be sought by any 
citizen, even one without a direct stake in litigation.  See Hartnett, supra note 99, at 2241 
& n.15. 
103 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 (2000). 
104 Id. at 778 n.8. 
105 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
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impact on presidential powers,” the jurisdictional question of whether a litigant has 
standing is decided under “Article III and not Article II.”106 Notably, perhaps, Justice 
Scalia’s scathing attack in Morrison v. Olson on the power to vest prosecutorial authority 
in independent prosecutors came in dissent.107 
In summary, then, the Article II Take Care Clause might well pose some obstacle to 
enforcement of the law by means of citizen suits in non-Article I courts, but the scope of 
any such limitation is at best uncertain.108 Citizen suits differ from qui tam actions in that 
the citizen-plaintiff lacks a personal stake altogether rather than, at least formally, sharing 
in the recovery the government is owed.109 On the other hand, it is unclear whether this 
matters, and whether it hurts or helps the constitutionality of citizen suits;  the petitions 
brought before a citizen suit tribunal need not comprise suits that could also be brought as 
criminal prosecutions, nor need they—as in the case of qui tam actions—implicate the 
possibility of money rightfully owed the government being paid to a private and 
uninjured complainant.110 Article II may well prohibit at least some classes of citizen 
suits in any type of tribunal, but it appears that at least some are permissible,111 and in 
 
106 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 n.4. 
107 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
108 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that citizen suits, even where Article III standing is 
present, might raise Article II concerns, but refraining from deciding what they might be). 
109 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000).  
110 See id. (describing nature of recovered damages in qui tam actions); Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 
at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern with the exaction of public fines by 
a private litigant). 
111 See Steven M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental 
Citizen Suits, 49 KAN. L. REV. 383, 418 (2001). 
26
any case any prohibition appears to bar certain (unspecified) relief rather than damaging 
the jurisdiction of any court, in or out of Article III.112 
D. OTHER SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS 
While Article II raises some concerns about citizen suits that would apply equally to 
Article III and non-Article III fora, the unique nature of non-Article III fora raises 
additional concerns that might not apply under Article III, even if citizen suits were 
possible in Article III courts.  In several different contexts, the Supreme Court has struck 
down clever legislative schemes in which Congress or a body under its control attempted 
to maintain control over the enforcement of legislation,113 or alter the way in which 
legislation can be enacted or repealed.114 If, in general, it is the province of Congress to 
“make all Laws . . . necessary and proper” to wield the powers of the federal 
government,115 and of the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,”116 separation of powers might dictate that the powers to interpret legislation, 
to strike legislation down as unconstitutional, and to declare executive action illegal are 
reserved to the courts.117 
112 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 778 n.8. 
113 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional the legislative 
veto); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a requirement that an agency 
board comprise nine members of Congress). 
114 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding unconstitutional the 
Line Item Veto Act). 
115 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
116 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
117 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).  It is worth noting 
that many citizen suits against private actors would not implicate these concerns, because 
in many cases they would not involve challenges either to the constitutionality of a statute 
or the behavior of the executive;  rather, the dispositive question would be whether the 
private actor factually complied with the law. 
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These traditional powers of the judiciary cannot be exercised by Congress, even as 
an incident to the Necessary and Proper Clause,118 because all involve altering the 
effective scope of a validly enacted119 statute, an action which is in effect similar to 
passing an amended law or a repeal. 120 Read strictly, the Constitution might be 
interpreted to require that the only bodies that can perform these functions without 
following the Presentment Clause121 requirements are Article III decisionmakers whose 
constitutional role is to “say what the law is,”122 not tribunals constituted as an exercise of 
congressional power.123 Obviously such a strict reading is not accurate, because the 
executive itself can—and, as a practical matter, must—interpret the scope of the laws it 
applies and is free to exercise discretion within the limits of their statutory language.124 
As a legislative body, Congress appears to be more limited in its capacity to 
interpret the law.  For example, even though every branch of government has a duty to 
obey the Constitution,125 it seems certain that Congress itself could not decide that a 
 
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
119 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438 & n.28. 
120 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952–54 (1982) (comparing the legislative veto of a 
decision by the Attorney General to the passage of a statute compelling a different 
decision on his part). 
121 U.S. CONST. art. I § 7 (describing procedure by which a bill must be passed by both 
Houses and signed by the President, or passed by 2/3 majority by both Houses, to become 
law). 
122 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
123 For example, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, see infra Part III.A, was created to 
provide an efficient substitute for private bills brought before Congress requesting 
monetary relief.  See Shimomura, supra note 57, at 648–62 (1985). 
124 See Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(describing the procedure for judicial review of administrative actions, in which the 
agency must act as prescribed by law if the statute is clear, but can decide how to handle 
ambiguities and open questions itself so long as its answers are “permissible 
construction[s]” of the statute). 
125 See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180 (holding that “[C]ourts, as well as other departments, are 
bound by” the Constitution). 
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previously-enacted statute is unconstitutional and discontinue its effect, at least without a 
presidential signature effecting its repeal or a two-thirds vote to override a presidential 
veto.126 If the power to declare statutes unconstitutional and deny them future effect is an 
exclusive incident of the judicial power granted by Article III, then Congress may lack 
the authority to grant such power to a non-Article III tribunal.  Moreover, while the 
ability of the judiciary to compel or enjoin executive action is well established, at least 
when the executive’s acts fall outside his or her discretion,127 the Supreme Court has 
ruled unconstitutional attempts by Congress to interfere directly with the implementation 
of enacted statutes, such as the legislative veto at issue in INS v. Chadha.128 The majority 
in Chadha held that the legislative veto represented, in effect, the unlawful passage of a 
law by one House of Congress, without acquiescence by the other house or approval of 
the President. 129 
However, the exact role of Article I courts in the constitutional separation of powers 
is not as clear as that:130 Article I courts are not Congress.  The term “Article I court” is 
perhaps misleading, because the term refers more to the source of authority for the 
court’s creation than to the status of the court itself in the constitutional scheme.131 After 
all, Congress creates administrative agencies, empowered both to perform administrative 
 
126 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7;  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49.  Cf. City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that only courts, not Congress, have the power 
to determine what constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
127 See Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925) (describing writs of 
mandamus as issuing to compel officers to perform ministerial duties). 
128 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982). 
129 See id. at 952–54. 
130 Cf. Bator, supra note 32. 
131 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 516 (1828). 
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adjudications and execute the laws, under its Article I authority, and yet these are rightly 
seen as part of the executive.   
Rather than assume that an Article I court’s powers are coextensive with 
Congress’s, perhaps a better approach would be to analyze, first, the effect of granting 
power to an Article I court on the balance of political power among the branches,132 and 
second, the form, composition, and accountability of such a court compared to the bodies 
it might supplant.133 Under such an analysis, Article I courts fare relatively well.  The 
legislative veto that was ruled unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha represented an effective 
transfer of executive power from Article II officials to Congress itself, and consisted of 
an exercise of power by a component of Congress—a single House—not intended to 
ordinarily exercise legislative authority at all.134 Likewise, the line-item veto ruled 
unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New York represented a significant shift in power 
from Congress to the President, who for the first time could eliminate individual budget 
items directly, and involved the ability of the President, a single individual, to interfere 
with the results of legislative bargaining among representatives.135 By contrast, Article I 
courts, at least as typically constituted, are relatively independent bodies, which, like the 
 
132 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 (“Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the 
Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the 
Executive in the legislative process.” (emphasis added)). 
133 See id. at 948–52 (emphasizing the importance of bicameralism, and analyzing the 
“legislative character of the one-House veto” in light of “the character of the 
congressional action it supplants”) 
134 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948–51 (discussing the Framers’ emphasis on bicameralism). 
135 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).  Note also the careful 
constitutional reservation of power over budgetary matters to the House of 
Representatives specifically.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising 
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . ”). 
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Article III judiciary, are not easily influenced by either the President or Congress; 136 
though they fail to guarantee the full panoply of Article III protections to litigants, they 
do not obviously tip the balance of power among the branches in any particular direction.  
The dangers of interference with executive power are lessened by the fact that Congress’s 
powers are not increased. 
Moreover, Article I courts exist today and are given the opportunity to nullify 
executive action.  As a particularly active example, the Tax Court regularly overturns 
decisions made by the IRS.137 The reviewability of executive decisionmaking by an 
Article I tribunal, far from undermining the power of the executive, can be seen as an 
integral part of a legislative scheme as validly passed by Congress and the Executive 
according to the “finely wrought and exhaustively considered . . . procedure” through 
which legislative power is exercised.138 The presence or absence of standing is 
unimportant to this analysis;  either way, the actions of the executive respecting a statute 
are, per the statute’s own command, evaluated by an independent, apolitical administrator 
in a forum that is judicial in character.  If this structure is acceptable for the Tax Court, it 
is difficult to see why it would be more problematic for a citizen suit tribunal.139 
136 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 172, 176 (2000) (guaranteeing statutorily to Court of Federal 
Claims judges a term of fifteen years, terminable only for “incompetency, misconduct, 
neglect of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical or mental disability,” and 
salary “at the rate of pay, and in the same manner, as judges of the district courts”). 
137 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 21 (13th ed. 2003).  Of 
course, Tax Court decisions, like other Article I decisions that countermand executive 
action, are reviewable in Article III courts, suggesting that the issue of Article III 
reviewability may be dispositive in determining whether an Article I citizen suit tribunal 
is constitutional. 
138 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
139 It is possible that under this view, the power to rule a statute unconstitutional would 
stretch the limits of what could fairly be considered a part of the execution contemplated 
by the statute itself.  Or, perhaps, ruling on constitutional questions might be the special 
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E. THE “PUBLIC RIGHTS” DOCTRINE 
A final argument in favor of the constitutionality of citizen suit tribunals arises from 
a way to view them as within the scope of decisions already committed to Article I 
tribunals:  “public rights” cases.140 Those citizen suits that are against the United States 
and challenge the validity of executive action or inaction would likely fall within the 
rubric of “public rights,” and would thus be amenable to adjudication by an Article I 
tribunal.  Although the Supreme Court has never clearly defined a “public rights” dispute, 
a very rough definition would be a non-criminal matter between the government and a 
citizen concerning the exercise of government authority.141 The canonical example is a 
suit for money damages against the United States,142 but the category also includes 
disputes involving customs,143 federal land grants,144 and immigration.145 The legality of 
non-Article III tribunals for public rights disputes is related to both sovereign immunity 
and separation of powers;  the category corresponds roughly with areas where the choice 
of how to administer the law, and whether to grant relief, was a prerogative of the 
political branches of government.146 
prerogative of Article III courts.  If rulings as to the validity of a statute, as opposed to 
rulings as to the validity of executive action under a statute, pose unique problems for an 
Article I tribunal, such jurisdiction can always be withheld from an Article I citizen suit 
tribunal without undermining the tribunal’s utility. 
140 See supra note 41. 
141 See id. at 67–68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). 
142 See Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929). 
143 Id. at 458. 
144 Id. at 456. 
145 See Fallon, supra note 34, at 967.  Immigration cases are, however, also subject to 
habeas review, at least when they involve detention.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001). 
146 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67–68. 
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While suits for injunctive relief against executive officials have not traditionally 
required a waiver of sovereign immunity,147 there is no reason why such suits could not 
be styled as suits against the government in the presence of an appropriate waiver, and if 
they were, would seem to fit within the “public rights” definition suggested by Crowell v. 
Benson.148 Furthermore, although the Constitution may require the availability of Article 
III adjudication of suits alleging government misconduct where constitutional concerns 
are implicated,149 it is almost definitional that a plaintiff without an “injury-in-fact” 
would lack an injury of constitutional magnitude.150 In any case, it does not follow that a 
 
147 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
148 “[T]he distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which 
arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the 
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.”   
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). 
 There is some tension between the public rights doctrine and the heightened 
importance of judicial independence in suits against the government, and this tension 
argues against expanding public rights beyond their historically supported, if illogical, 
contours.  See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 n.20 (“Doubtless it could be argued that 
the need for independent judicial determination is greatest in cases arising between the 
Government and an individual. But the rationale for the public-rights line of cases lies not 
in political theory, but rather in Congress’ and this Court's understanding of what power 
was reserved to the Judiciary by the Constitution as a matter of historical fact.”).  That 
said, even though the forum and thus the application of the public rights doctrine are 
novel here, there is a strong argument that citizen suits fit within the doctrine:  they are 
effectively petitions requesting, as a matter of “sovereign grace,” that the political 
branches correct the error of their ways.  Such a petition, like a request for money 
damages paid from the public treasury, is a “matter[] that historically could have been 
determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] departments.”  Id. at 68.  For 
additional discussion of the tension inherent in the public rights doctrine, see Redish, 
supra note 58 (criticizing the doctrine). 
149 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). 
150 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining an “injury-in-
fact” as “an invasion of a legally protected interest”). 
33
suit brought before a non-Article III tribunal would be impermissible where the plaintiff 
chooses to bring it there.151 
III. CASE STUDIES 
A. ADVISORY OPINIONS IN THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: A U.S. PRECEDENT FOR 
ADJUDICATING “NON-CASES”
The claim that adjudication of disputes not falling within the Article III definition of 
“case or controversy” is constitutional when done by non-Article III tribunals is bolstered 
by precedents demonstrating that it has been done before.  Trivial examples abound;  
because the line between executive action and adjudication is of necessity a fuzzy one, 
and administrative agencies must make decisions that are judicial in character regularly, 
the power of non-Article III federal government bodies to wield judicial power outside 
the confines of “cases or controversies” is clear, at least at the margins.152 There also 
exists at least one clearer precedent in the U.S. court system, however:  the explicit 
jurisdictional grant to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to issue advisory opinions at the 
behest of Congress.153 
151 By way of comparison, the ability of plaintiffs to choose to litigate federal 
constitutional claims in state courts—non-Article III fora—is well established.  E.g.,
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366–67 (2001) (“Under [our] system of dual sovereignty, 
we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus 
presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States 
. . . . That this would be the case was assumed by the Framers.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
152 See supra text accompanying & note 44;  see also Resnick, supra note 34, at 619–20 
(estimating that the life-tenured Article III judiciary is vastly outnumbered by 
administrative law judges, “hearing officers,” “examiners,” and similar civil servants who 
carry on judicial functions outside the formal and independent context of lawsuits as they 
are known in Article III). 
153 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (2000) provides that “[a]ny bill, except a bill for a pension may be 
referred by either house of Congress” to the court for a report in conformity with 
procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2509.  Id. 
34
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court154 whose primary purpose is 
to hear claims for money damages against the United States government.155 Such claims 
qualify as “cases or controversies” under Article III, as they are brought by a plaintiff 
who has been injured in some way and is demanding money damages;  indeed, in this 
core role, the Court of Federal Claims can only hear cases demanding monetary relief.156 
When hearing such cases, the court adheres to Article III standing requirements, 
apparently on the statutory interpretation ground that its appeals are intended to go to the 
Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is barred from ruling one way 
or another on a purely advisory lower-court judgment.157 However, the court has also 
been granted specialized jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions upon congressional 
reference.158 
In the court’s advisory capacity, bills—typically private bills for monetary relief 
outside a preexisting statutory entitlement—are referred to the court by a resolution of 
 
154 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2000) (“The court [of Federal Claims] is declared to be a court 
established under article I of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
155 See The History of the United States Court of Federal Claims, at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/USCFChistory.htm (last visited 16 March 2004). 
156 The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000), grants the Court of Federal Claims 
jurisdiction over suits “any claim against the United States . . . for liquidated or 
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”  Certain collateral orders are 
permitted, for example directing restoration of a claimant to a position of federal 
employment, but no general grant to hear suits demanding injunctive relief is given.  See 
id. § 1491(a)(2). 
157 See Welsh v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 417, 420–21 (1983);  see also Muskrat v. United 
States, 219 U.S. 346, 361–63 (holding that Article III courts could not render advisory 
opinions);  Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 256 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the case-or-controversy requirement must be met in a suit in the Court of Federal 
Claims, without discussing the Article I status of that court). 
158 See 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (2000). 
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either house of Congress.159 The court conducts what amounts to a full trial to determine 
the factual merits of the claim for relief;160 the procedures for holding such a trial are 
incompletely specified and, at times, have been quite informal,161 but typically follow 
more closely the pattern of any other litigation before the court.162 Appeals, of course, 
cannot be made to an Article III court;  instead, the statute calls for the selection of a 
three-judge review panel from among the judges of the court.163 This panel reviews the 
findings of the trial judge designated as the hearing officer for the case, much as an 
appellate court would review the determinations of a trial court.164 The report of the 
court is then returned to Congress, which is free to accept or ignore the court’s 
recommendations.165 In practice, however, it almost always accepts the court’s 
recommendations, even when there has been an intervening election and the current 
Congress openly admits that it would not have referred the matter to the court.166 
In evaluating the feasibility of an Article I citizen suit tribunal, several facets of this 
existing Court of Federal Claims process are illuminating.  First and most broadly, the 
 
159 See 28 U.S.C. § 2509(a) (2000);  see also Jeffrey M. Glosser, Congressional 
Reference Cases in the United States Court of Claims: A Historical and Current 
Perspective, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 596–98 (1976) 
160 See 28 U.S.C. § 2509 (2000).   
161 See, e.g., In re Dept. of Def. Cable Television Franchise Agreements Nat’l Def. 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996—Section 823, 36 Fed. Cl. 171, 172 (1996) 
(holding a “non-adversarial” hearing “in a fashion similar to a congressional hearing or 
agency rulemaking proceeding”). 
162 See Glosser, supra note 159, at 605–06. 
163 28 U.S.C. § 2509(a) 
164 Land v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 231, 233 (1997).  As in a typical trial court– 
appellate court relationship, the legal conclusions of the hearing officer are reviewed de 
novo; the factual findings are reviewed for clear error.  Id. at 233–34;  see also R. CT.
FED. CL. app. D, p. 8. 
165 See Kanehl v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 89, 96–97 (1997). 
166 Glosser, supra note 159, at 627 (citing as an example S. REP. NO. 1274, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5 (1974)). 
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advisory opinions process is a well-established example of “non-case” jurisdiction being 
granted to an Article I court.  The advisory jurisdiction of the court was first granted over 
a hundred years ago.167 Although the Court determined in Glidden v. Zdanok that the 
Court of Claims, the Court of Federal Claim’s predecessor court, was an Article III court 
whose ability to render advisory opinions was thus in doubt,168 Congress soon updated 
the congressional reference statutes to refer cases not to Article III judges, but to solely to 
Article I commissioners under their supervision.169 Consensus since then has been that 
this rendered the reference jurisdiction constitutional,170 and today’s arrangement—in 
which the former commissioners of the Court of Claims have been reconstituted as the 
Court of Federal Claims, and what had been the Article III division was folded into a new 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit171—has been ratified by the Supreme Court, at 
least implicitly.172 
167 See Bowman Act, 22 Stat. 485, 485–86 (1883) (granting Court of Claims reference 
jurisdiction from either house of Congress or from any executive department) (current 
equivalent at 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (2000)); see also Alleman v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 144, 
150–51 (1908). 
168 Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962) (noting that because the Court of Claims 
as then constituted was an Article III court, its ability to render advisory opinions was in 
doubt, but not deciding the constitutionality of doing so);  see id. at 587 (Clark, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Court of Claims, if given further advisory references, should 
decline jurisdiction over them as incompatible with Article III). 
169 Act of Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 958 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1970)). 
170 See Shimomura, supra note 57, at 689 & n.533 (citing 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & M. 
BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS 63 (1978) for the proposition that 
giving congressional reference cases to the non-Article III commissioners rendered the 
arrangement constitutional). 
171 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1983)).  See generally Shimomura, supra 
note 57, at 696–99 (discussing the post-1982 arrangement of the Court of Federal Claims 
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
172 See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.23 (1982); 
Shimomura, supra note 57, at 698 (discussing Northern Pipeline). 
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A second facet worthy of mention is the apparent reasoning behind the grant of 
advisory jurisdiction to a court-like, non-Article III tribunal:  to bring many of the 
advantages of judicial resolution to a federal “case” falling outside the scope of Article III 
heads of jurisdiction.  As the post-Glidden legislative history of the congressional 
reference jurisdiction indicates, Congress wished to maintain a forum in which complex 
factual issues could be evaluated in an evidentiary, frequently adversarial proceeding by 
an independent and impartial tribunal.173 These are values traditionally associated with 
Article III courts;174 in this instance where Article III courts are constitutionally 
unavailable, Congress has turned to an Article I substitute. 
A final facet, though, provides a potentially difficult contrast for our proposed 
model of a citizen suit tribunal capable of issuing binding judgments:  by definition, 
congressional reference cases are advisory and do not involve a binding judgment.175 
Indeed, even though hearing officers in reference cases can order discovery, issue 
subpoenas, and the like, such subpoenas are not enforceable by compulsory judicial 
power, even though comparable orders in non-advisory Court of Federal Claims cases 
would be;  rather, Congress has provided that any failures to comply with court orders 
should be noted in the final report to Congress.176 Because, unlike ordinary claims cases, 
congressional references are not subject to Article III review in the Court of Appeals for 
 
173 See H.R. REP., NO. 306, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 3–4 (1965);  Glosser, supra note 159, 
at 605. 
174 See Resnick, supra note 34. 
175 See 28 U.S.C. § 2509(e) (2000). 
176 Id. § 2509(f). 
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the Federal Circuit,177 the non-self-enforcing character of orders in reference cases avoids 
the constitutional difficulties that might arise from granting coercive powers to a non-
Article III body, without possibility of appeal to an Article III court.178 Moreover, there 
is no potential problem with interference with the executive, because no executive action 
is ever compelled;  all that is at issue is a possible outlay from the public fisc, which is 
unquestionably within Congress’s authority,179 and even that is not fully delegated in 
reference cases, only in ordinary claims actions. 
Congressional reference cases, then, provide a suggestive model of how a dispute 
falling outside the scope of Article III can constitutionally and practically be tried by an 
Article I tribunal, but do not resolve all of the issues implicated by a proposal to try 
citizen suits challenging executive action in such a tribunal.  Another source of models is 
the experience of other nations.  The next Part will discuss one of these examples, and 
will draw parallels to possible experience in the United States. 
B. STANDING IN CITIZEN SUITS IN AUSTRALIA 
Although standing in United States federal courts is principally treated as arising 
from Article III,180 the concept is a broader one that, in various comparable forms, has 
found application in other common law jurisdictions,181 and even in some civil law 
 
177 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2509 (2000) (sending reference cases, after consideration by the 
review panel, directly back to Congress) with 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) (the jurisdictional 
statute of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
178 See discussion supra Part II.A.5. 
179 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 9. 
180 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component 
of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III.”). 
181 E.g., Croome v. Tasmania, (1997) 191 CLR 119 (Australia); Thorson v. Attorney Gen. 
of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (Canada); R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, 1 Q.B. 
380 (1966) (England). 
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ones.182 The U.S. has comparatively strict standing laws;183 where standing exists as a 
limitation in other common law jurisdictions, it is frequently closely tied to the grant of a 
substantive right of action.184 
182 See P. van Dijk, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE 
REQUIREMENT OF AN INTEREST TO SUE 130–52 (1980) (dicussing the interest to sue 
requirements in recours pour excès de pouvoir suits, a method for challenging ultra vires 
administrative action in France). 
183 In the extreme, a number of countries place essentially no limits on who may bring 
suit to correct allegedly illegal actions.  India, for example, permits any concerned citizen 
to bring to the Supreme Court’s attention constitutional injustices in need of correction by 
letter as well as by more formal suit: 
This Court has on numerous occasions pointed out that where there is a 
violation of a fundamental or other legal right of a person or class of 
persons who by reason of poverty or disability or socially or economically 
disadvantageous position cannot approach a Court of Law for justice, it 
would be open to any public spirited individual or social action group to 
bring an action for vindication of the fundamental or other legal right of 
such individual or class of individuals and this can be done not only by 
filing a regular writ petition but also by addressing a letter to the Court. 
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086, ¶ 2.  Some African countries 
permit suits by any citizen to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.  See Okey 
Ilofulunwa, Locus Standi in Nigeria, at http://www.hurilaws.org/locus_standi_art.htm 
(last visited 21 March 2004) (discussing ability to do this in Gambia and Ghana). 
 Even England has occasionally permitted suits by public interest organizations with 
no particularized injury to proceed in the discretion of the court where the organization is 
better equipped to litigate than any of the parties actually harmed.  See R. v Inspectorate 
of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace Ltd., [1994] All E.R. 329 (permitting Greenpeace to 
bring a challenge to the operation of a nuclear waste processing plant because 
Greenpeace had the “expertise” to mount a “well-informed” legal challenge). 
184 See, e.g., VAN DIJK, supra note 182, at 71 (describing locus standi in English statutory 
law as permitting suit only by those entitled to a statutory remedy).  Cf. Sunstein, supra 
note 1, at 173–79(describing pre-New Deal standing law in the United States as following 
a similar model).   
 Despite this standard approach in which those with a legal right would have 
standing to uphold it, however, it was also apparently possible in the English tradition for 
unaffected third parties to request the extraordinary writ of prohibition, so as to quash the 
purported jurisdiction of tribunals that did not legally have jurisdiction.  The theory was 
that anyone could sue to vindicate this interest of the King’s, and formally the suit was in 
the King’s name;  its granting was discretionary.  See VAN DIJK, supra note 182, at 48–
49.  Cf. discussion supra accompanying note 102. 
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Despite these differences, however, the problem of how to best accommodate 
challenges to regulatory action in the modern administrative state while not 
overburdening the court system is common to most jurisdictions today, and certain 
illuminating parallels can be drawn.  This Part will briefly examine the law of standing 
and a few resulting legal developments in another English-speaking, federal, common-
law jurisdiction whose experiences shed particular light on the citizen suit tribunal 
problem: Australia.  Australia has a constitutionally imposed standing requirement 
parallel to (and derivative from) that of the United States;185 it also has a specialized 
tribunal for mounting challenges to government action outside of the normal federal court 
system, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that provides a ready model for how an 
Article I citizen tribunal might function. 
It should be noted, by way of disclaimer, that this is not an attempt to argue that the 
law of standing in the United States should or does “conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world”186; rather, the point is that, because a citizen-suit tribunal would be constitutional 
under American law, it is instructive to observe whether, as a structural matter, such 
tribunals have been instituted abroad.  The existence and apparent success of the 
Australian system suggests that the U.S. Congress might find an Adminstrative Appeals 
Tribunal—with an expansive, non-Article III conception of standing—useful here. 
 
185 See Leslie Zines, Federal, Associated, and Accrued Jurisdiction, in THE AUSTRALIAN 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 265, 265 (Brian Opeskin & Fiona Wheeler, eds. 2000) 
(discussing role of U.S. Constitution in shaping Australian). 
186 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
vigorously against the application of foreign law to decide questions of U.S. 
constitutional law). 
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1. Standing in Australia 
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution sets out the constitutional basis for the 
Australian federal judiciary, which like Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides for a 
high court and leaves to the legislature the power to create lower courts.187 Also like the 
U.S. Constitution, it provides for a number of heads of jurisdiction, including what 
amount to diversity and federal question jurisdiction, in which the federal courts may 
adjudicate.188 These heads of jurisdiction refer to “matters” that the courts have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate,189 which have been interpreted at various points to be 
identical190 or at least analogous to191 “cases” and “controversies”;192 as in the United 
States, the matter requirement serves to bar advisory opinions.193 
187 See AUSTRALIAN CONST., ch. III, § 71.  In Australia, the high court is known simply as 
the High Court.  Id. 
188 See id. §§ 73, 75–77.
189 For example, the head of jurisdiction that best approximates what in the United States 
is federal question jurisdiction provides as follows: 
Additional Original Jurisdiction. 
76. The Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the 
High Court in any matter— 
 (i) Arising under this Constitution, or involving its interpretation: 
 (ii) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament: 
 (iii) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction: 
 (iv) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of 
 different States. 
 
Power to define jurisdiction. 
77. With respect to any of the matters mentioned [in sections including the 
above, § 76] the Parliament may make laws— 
 (i) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal court other than the 
 High Court:  
 . . .
Id. §§ 76–77. 
190 See Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd., (1981) 33 A.L.R. 
465 (Mason, J.) (“Th[e] formulation [of “matter”] does not depart from the American 
42
However, particularly in recent years, this latter bar has been weakened 
significantly by the Australian High Court’s increasingly “relaxed approach” towards 
constitutional standing requirements;194 for instance, suits by Australian states 
challenging the constitutionality of Commonwealth laws have been upheld, whether or 
not specific state interests are alleged.195 Indeed, in Truth About Motorways v. 
Macquarie, the High Court specifically distinguished the standing rules arising from the 
“matter” requirement from those arising from the “case and controversy” requirement 
according to Lujan, refusing to hold invalid a citizen suit provision in a federal antitrust 
statute.196 The Court did not, however, decide whether the plaintiff had standing197 nor 
clearly delineate the content of the “matter” requirement, but appeared to adopt a 
simplified viewpoint in which the conferral of a legal right by the legislature—including 
to the public at large—was sufficient to grant standing.198 Despite this, the “matter” 
requirement is apparently not completely devoid of content.199 
conception of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’, notably that expressed by Field J in Re Pacific 
Railway Commission and Smith v Adams . . .”). 
191 See generally Henry Burmeister, Limitations on Federal Adjudication, in THE 
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 227, supra note 185, at 230–35. 
192 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. 
193 See Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, (1921) 29 C.L.R. 257; Burmeister, supra note 
191, at 235–45.  
194 Burmeister, supra note 191, at 248;  see also WHO CAN SUE? A REVIEW OF THE LAW 
OF STANDING, Aust. Law Reform Comm., Disc. Paper 61, Oct. 1995. 
195 Burmeister, supra note 191, at 248. 
196 Truth About Motorways Pty. Ltd. v. Macquarie Infrastructure Inv. Mgmt. Ltd., (2000) 
H.C.A. 11, 169 A.L.R. 616, 620. 
197 The procedural posture of the case meant that if the citizen suit provision was not 
unconstitutional, the case would be remanded without resolution of other issues.  Id. at 
619–20. 
198 Id. Interestingly, this holding, and the modern English approach to standing where 
statutory cases are concerned, see supra note 184, bolster the argument that standing in 
the common-law tradition flows from the existence of a cause of action, and that the 
American separation of injury-in-fact from the cause of action is misguided and 
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2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
Like the U.S., Australia also possesses an extensive administrative state, including a 
system of federal tribunals established outside the scope of Chapter III and its 
authorization to create federal courts.200 Australia has one especially noteworthy tribunal 
with no direct United States analog, however:  the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT).201 The AAT is a general tribunal intended to review the decisions of 
administrative officials;  it has jurisdiction over decisions under hundreds of independent 
Commonwealth statutes that specifically provide for AAT review.202 The tribunal’s 
 
ahistorical.  See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 166;  see also William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 238–39 (1988) (arguing that the question of 
standing should collapse to the question of whether the plaintiff can state a cause of 
action).  If is theory is correct, then Lujan was incorrectly decided, and raw citizen suits 
should be seen as constitutional even in Article III courts so long as Congress confers a 
substantive cause of action to the citizens at large.  This debate is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
 As an interesting aside, the primary clause used by the Macquarie Court to 
distinguish the American Article III from the Australian Chapter III was AUSTRALIAN 
CONST., ch. 3, § 75(v), which provides original jurisdiction for the High Court to issue 
extraordinary writs and injunctions against federal officials.  This was seen by the 
Macquarie Court as evidence of the Australian Constitution’s concern for granting the 
judiciary power to curb unlawful executive action, and according to the Court the clause 
was inserted into the Australian Constitution specifically to avoid a result analogous to 
that in Marbury v. Madison. 169 A.L.R. at 644 (Gummow, J.).  The Court also cited the 
availability of extraordinary writs to all citizens.  See discussion supra note 184.  What 
this analysis seems to miss—with curious logical consequences—is that Marbury 
represented only the Supreme Court’s lack of original jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
mandamus, not the exclusion of such authority from the American conception of Article 
III judicial power as vested in the lower courts. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803).  
199 At a minimum, suits still need to attempt to vindicate the legal right of some party;  
unless the legislature explicitly grants a legal right to the entire populace, citizen standing 
is still precluded.  See Macquarie, at 169 A.L.R. at 619–20. 
200 See Margaret Allars, Federal Courts and Federal Tribunals: Pluralism and 
Democratic Values, in THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 191, supra note 185, at 204–
09. 
201 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). 
202 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Jurisdiction List: Decisions Subject to Review as 
at 3 March 2004, available at 
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procedures are relatively informal;  citizens who with to complain can petition by letter as 
well as by formal application.203 Its constitutionality is uncontroversial.204 Appeals from 
the AAT to the (Chapter III) Federal Court are permissible on issues of law,205 and the 
tribunal has the power to issue at least some binding orders.206 
Of particular concern to this article is the role of standing at the AAT.  When other 
legislation provides for it, the AAT may give advisory opinions;207 however, the AAT’s 
core purpose is to assist those aggrieved by an adverse decision of some kind, and its 
jurisdictional statute reflects this assumption, permitting review of specified decisions 
upon application to the AAT by anyone “whose interests are affected by the decision.”208 
The import of this phrase is a matter of some controversy.  In Allan v. Transurban City 
Link, the High Court faced the appeal of a pure citizen suit from the tribunal;  Allan, a 
citizen who no longer lived in an area affected by a highway construction project, had 
attempted to challenge the legality of its licensing.209 The majority opinion did not 
directly confront the question of constitutional or statutory standing in the AAT;  rather, 
the Court held that the substantive cause of action was unavailable to the plaintiff under 
the particular statute in question, and thereby ultimately affirmed the AAT’s decision that 
 
http://www.aat.gov.au/LegislationAndJurisdiction/JurisdictionList.htm (last visited 21 
March 2004). 
203 See Applying to the AAT, at
http://www.aat.gov.au/ApplyingToTheAAT/WhenCanTheAATHelp.htm  (last visited 21 
March 2004). 
204 See Allan v. Transurban City Link Ltd., (2001) H.C.A. 58, 183 A.L.R. 380, 383. 
205 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Austl.) § 44.  The question of whether 
an appellant might have standing at the Tribunal, but not standing in the Federal Court, 
has apparently not been addressed. 
206 See id. 
207 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Austl.) § 59. 
208 See id. § 25.
209 Allan, 183 A.L.R. at 382–83. 
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Allan lacked standing to bring the challenge.210 However, Judge Kirby wrote an 
intriguing dissent—most of which was not in contradiction to anything the majority 
held—analyzing the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and standing requirements in 
detail.211 On the issue of how the “matter” requirement affects standing in the AAT, he 
wrote: 
Once one moves from the commencement of proceedings in a federal 
court, where the constitutional necessity of demonstrating the existence of 
a “matter” imposes some constraints on the law of standing, substantial 
scope for permitting the initiation of tribunal proceedings by a broader 
range of persons in a wider range of circumstances, is available to the 
federal lawmaker.  The tendency of federal legislation is to move away 
from authorising only particular persons (such as ministers, statutory 
agencies or officers) or persons limited by a controlling adjective 
(“aggrieved”, “interested”), to “any person” (as now appears in several 
federal laws).  This tendency adds to the need for caution about 
approaching the issue of “standing” as if it always presents a generic 
problem.  In one sense it does.  But the solution to the problem in a 
particular case must always take as its starting point the language and 
structure of the legislative prescription in question.212 
Judge Kirby thus concluded that there are no constitutional limits on standing in the 
AAT;  only the implementing legislation matters.213 He then advocated a generally 
liberal approach to interpreting that legislation, taking into account the potential 
inconveniences to regulatory objects from liberalized standing rules, common sense, and 
the danger of “intermeddlers,” but also the need for flexibility in the modern 
administrative state and the fact that, should standing rules prove too expansive, 
Parliament could always take some or all jurisdiction away from the tribunal.214 
210 Id. at 388–89. 
211 Id. at 392–96 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
212 Id. at 393 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
213 Id. at 395–96 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
214 Id. 
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3. Lessons for the United States 
In short—despite its still-incompletely-defined status as a forum for citizen suits—
the AAT provides a model of what a citizen suit tribunal in the United States might look 
like.  Although Australia’s more-liberal approach to standing and overt rejection of Lujan 
do minimize the High Court’s concerns with the effects of broadly construing AAT 
jurisdiction, the essential constitutional position of the AAT is much the same as an 
Article I court:  a creature not of the ordinary federal judicial power and thus probably 
not bound by its limitations, but acceptable nonetheless because of the needs and 
structures of the modern administrative state.  The possibility of review of matters of law, 
whether to the Federal Court or to a U.S. Court of Appeals, mitigates the independence 
concerns that one might have with vesting such power outside Article/Chapter III.215 
Judge Kirby’s analysis of how some notion of standing might still be incorporated 
into citizen suits by a tribunal might also find an analog in the United States.  Above and 
beyond constitutional standing requirements, U.S. courts have adhered to concepts of 
prudential standing.216 In the context of an Article I tribunal, such rules would be 
presumptive;  the Supreme Court has indicated that, as doctrines of federal common law, 
they can be freely overridden by Congress.217 But as background rules, they echo some 
of the elements of Judge Kirby’s balancing tests:  both sets of rules include, for example, 
 
215 Compare Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Austl.) § 44 (permitting appeals 
from the AAT to the Federal Court on matters of law only) with Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22 (1932) (permitting apparently final determination of “non-jurisdictional” facts by 
an administrative tribunal, without review by an Article III court). 
216 Valley Forge Christian College v. ACLU, 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982). 
217 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
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an analysis of the intended beneficiaries of a statutory cause of action,218 a concern with 
intermeddlers,219 and a sensitivity to the competences of the tribunal.220 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Australia provides a remarkable opportunity for comparative law studies in the area 
of federal courts because the structure of its federal court system so closely approximates 
our own and because its judges so often use United States law as a reference.  Through 
the prism of Australian experience, we can see the possibility for an American judicial 
experiment:  a tribunal freed from the constraints of Article III to adjudicate regulatory 
disputes of public concern, and empowered to develop procedures that admit aggrieved 
private litigants, but also better equipped to adjudicate today’s complex, “polycentric” 
regulatory disputes than an ordinary court.221 Such an experiment need not be broad in 
scope;  one advantage of the AAT model is that though it has become a court of 
generalized jurisdiction, its jurisdiction is still granted on a statute-by-statute basis, and 
 
218 Compare Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (requiring that plaintiffs 
fall within the zone of interests created by statute) with Allan, 183 A.L.R. at 392–93 
(Kirby, J., dissenting) (advocating a close reading of the enacting statute). 
219 Compare Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (denying standing to those 
whose claims are based on the legal rights of private third parties) with Allan, 183 A.L.R. 
at 391 (Kirby, J., dissenting) (discussing “intermeddlers”). 
220 Compare Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500 (discussing competence of courts to adjudicate 
generalized public issues) with Allan, 183 A.L.R. at [pin] (dicussing flexibility of 
legislative solutions and procedures to accommodate the modern regulatory state). 
221 See Fuller, supra note 30 (arguing that the traditional adversarial system is ill-
equipped to handle problems, called “polycentric,” with complicated effects on a 
multiplicity of parties);  see also supra Part III.A (discussing the ability of the Court of 
Federal Claims, in advisory cases, to hold informal hearings in which a number of non-
adversarial parties can present evidence); supra note 203 and accompanying text 
(discussing the ability of the AAT to initiate informal proceedings by letter). 
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the nature of the disputes it adjudicates is such that jurisdiction can be withdrawn 
completely if necessary.222 Such would be the case here too. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court might well balk on separation of powers grounds, 
Article III appears to create no barrier to the establishment of such a tribunal under 
Article I, and the problems of enforceable judgments and appealability appear to be 
solvable.  We already have one Article I tribunal hearing disputes that fall outside the 
scope of Article III cases and controversies, albeit in a purely advisory capacity.223 An 
Article I citizen suit tribunal may or may not be helpful or prudent;  but it is 
constitutionally permissible, and so whether it is helpful or prudent is for Congress to 
decide. 
 
222 However, the large number of statutes that confer AAT jurisdiction suggest that the 
experiment has been working, or at least has been perceived to work, in Australia.  See 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Jurisdiction List, supra note 202.  Also promising is the 
fact that the tribunal has been mimicked in Australia at a more local level.  See 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act of 1989, No. 51 (ACT) (Austl.) (creating an 
administrative appeals tribunal for the Australian Capital Territory). 
223 See discussion of the Court of Federal Claims’ advisory opinion jurisdiction, supra 
Part III.A.  Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims might well be a reasonable forum for an 
initial grant of citizen suit jurisdiction. 
